INTRODUCTION
The U.S. economy expanded at a rapid pace in the second half of the 1990s, spurred by a resurgence in labor productivity growth. Considerable research has highlighted a central role for information technology (IT) in that resurgence, reflecting the enormous improvements in priceperformance ratios for IT capital goods and, more fundamentally, for the semiconductors that power this capital.
1 In recent years, however, semiconductor prices have fallen less rapidly than in the second half of the 1990s, tempering the price declines for IT capital goods and likely contributing to the more restrained spending on these goods. Given the key role for semiconductors in these developments, three questions demand attention: Why did semiconductor prices fall so rapidly in the second half of the 1990s? Why has the rate of price decline slowed more recently? What do these price swings tell us about the rate of advance in semiconductor technology?
Several studies -most notably, Jorgenson (2001) , Flamm (2004) Jorgenson linked the more rapid price declines starting in the mid-1990s to a shift from threeyear to two-year technology cycles in the semiconductor industry. This paper contributes to the existing literature on semiconductor prices in three ways.
First, we document the facts using the longest price series that can be constructed from consistent sources. In particular, we present data through 2004 on constant-quality prices for a broad aggregate of semiconductors and for two important types of chips: microprocessor units (MPUs) and dynamic random access memory chips (DRAMs). Second, we formally test for structural breaks in the price series, using a state-of-the-art framework that allows us to search for multiple unknown breakpoints. Our paper is the first to apply any econometric analysis to this question.
Third, in contrast to previous research, we analyze not only the steeper declines in constantquality prices of MPU and DRAM chips in the second half of the 1990s but also the reversion to slower price declines in recent years. The centerpiece of this analysis is a simple price decomposition, which we implement for MPU chips using data on Intel's revenues, costs, and chip output; we implement the same decomposition for DRAM chips using data for Micron Technology, the largest DRAM producer in the United States.
We find compelling statistical evidence of a structural break in MPU prices in 1994 and a second break in 2001. For DRAMs, we find reasonably strong evidence of an initial break in 1995 and a second break in 2001; this timing lines up closely with that of the breaks in MPU 3 Moore's "Law" has evolved over time. The initial version, dating back to Moore (1965) , asserted that the number of components on a chip would double every year. In an update ten years later, Moore argued that this pace could not be sustained, predicting that the doubling time going forward would be every two years. Moore's 1975 forecast turned out to be too pessimistic, and the current version of Moore's Law represents an average of his predictions in 1965 and 1975 . See Flamm (2004 for an interesting history of Moore's Law. prices. For the series on overall semiconductor prices, we find evidence of a break in 1995 but no evidence of subsequent breaks. In discussing these results, we attempt to explain why the strength of the evidence differs across the price series.
Turning to the decomposition of price changes, our framework attributes the steeper price declines for DRAM chips during the second half of the 1990s to two factors: a sharp deceleration in chip production costs and a narrowing of price-cost markups from unusually high levels. For MPU chips, shrinking markups played a role as well, but the story concerning cost reductions is more nuanced than for DRAM chips. Unlike the results for DRAM, our decomposition shows that the downtrend in Intel's cost per transistor for MPU chips did not quicken appreciably in the mid-1990s. Instead, Intel appears to have used rapid advances in chipmaking technology to increase the capabilities of its MPU chips at a much faster pace than in earlier years. This explosion in chip quality, combined with little change from prior trends in cost per transistor, was the prime force behind the sharp declines in constant-quality MPU prices in the second half of the 1990s.
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For the period since 2001, our decomposition tells a fairly straightforward story. The slower price declines for both DRAMs and MPUs reflect a recovery in price-cost markups from depressed levels and less favorable cost trends. Both factors play a major role in explaining the return to price declines more characteristic of the period before the mid-1990s.
To what extent do these price dynamics reflect fundamental shifts in the pace of advance in semiconductor technology? This is an important question because researchers (see Oliner and Sichel, 2000a and 2002, for The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic facts about semiconductor price trends. Section 3 carries out the econometric tests for structural breaks in these series, and section 4 implements our decomposition of DRAM and MPU prices. Section 5 analyzes the connection between prices and costs on the one hand and technological advance on the other. Section 6 briefly reviews our conclusions.
BASIC FACTS ABOUT SEMICONDUCTOR PRICES
We analyze three constant-quality indexes of semiconductor prices: the aggregate index for integrated circuits used by Oliner and Sichel (2000a and 2002) 6 The data appendix provides further information about these price series.
We use the aggregate Oliner-Sichel series because it is known in the literature and is similar to series used by other researchers, including Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000 ), Jorgenson (2001 ), and Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002 . This aggregate series includes many types of integrated circuits. We focus on DRAM and MPU chips for the following reasons. MPUs 5 Similar concerns have been expressed by other researchers. Feenstra, Reinsdorf, Slaughter, and Harper (2005) point to changes in the terms of trade -which appear to be an important source of IT price declines -as a possible wedge between these price declines and the pace of technological progress. Basu, Fernald, Fisher, and Kimball (2005) highlight a number of reasons why IT price trends could be a poor proxy for technological progress. And, focusing specifically on MPU chips, Aizcorbe (2005) explores the potential for increased competition to have influenced the price declines for these chips in the mid-1990s. 6 For MPUs and DRAMs, the series used for the earlier periods are available for several years after 1992. We confirmed that these series moved in sync with the Federal Reserve series during the overlap period.
represented nearly half of the dollar value of integrated circuits shipped by U. These swings in semiconductor prices have had a noticeable effect on the prices of computing equipment, which use semiconductors as a key input. Figure 2 displays the price index for computers and peripheral equipment in the National Income and Product Accounts along with the aggregate index of semiconductor prices. Both series are plotted as rolling percent changes over three-year periods to make the underlying trends more apparent. As shown, both price series fell especially rapidly in the late 1990s, and both have since reverted to a pace of decline more characteristic of the period before the mid-1990s. The swings are more pronounced for semiconductor prices than for computer prices, as would be expected given that semiconductors represent only a portion of the production cost for computers. Nonetheless, semiconductor prices clearly influence the prices of computing equipment and thus indirectly affect the pace of business investment in IT capital and the growth of productivity throughout the economy.
IDENTIFYING STRUCTURAL BREAKS IN SEMICONDUCTOR PRICES
To the best of our knowledge, previous discussions of changing trends in semiconductor prices have been based on casual observation. Although pictures such as figure 1 can be very instructive, we will now assess whether there is statistical evidence of a structural break in semiconductor prices.
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Tests for Structural Change
For the case of a single breakpoint of unknown timing, many tests -beginning with Quandt (1960) -have been proposed for identifying the most likely breakpoint. However, figure   1 suggests that the semiconductor price series might contain more than one breakpoint. To account for the possibility of multiple breaks, we use tests proposed by Bai and Perron (1998 Because semiconductor prices have a strong downward trend, we pre-tested (the log of) these series for unit roots using Dickey-Fuller tests and tests proposed by Banerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1992) . These tests uniformly failed to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the semiconductor price series at the 5 percent level. Therefore, we will conduct our break tests on the log differences of prices, and the starting point for the tests is a regression of the form:
9 See Hanson (2001) for an overview of the literature on tests for structural change.
where Δy represents the log difference of y. This regression can be run for every possible breakpoint k, with the indicator variable equal to zero for all periods prior to the breakpoint and unity for all periods after the breakpoint. For each breakpoint, the coefficient on the indicator variable, α 1 , measures the amount by which the average growth rate of y differs between the first and second subsamples.
To conduct the first stage of BP's sequential procedure, we use the unweighted version of the double maximum test, the so-called UDMAX test. For this test, we first estimate equation 1 at each possible breakpoint and calculate the chi-squared statistic described by BP. The date associated with the maximum value of this chi-squared statistic across all possible breaks is used to divide the sample into two subsamples. Given this proposed break, we then roll through the first subsample to identify the date associated with the maximum value of the chi-squared statistic in that subsample and repeat this procedure in the second subsample. The maximum value of the chi-squared statistic from the first subsample is compared to that from the second subsample. The date associated with larger of the two is used to divide the subsample that contains that date into two further subsamples. This procedure is repeated until one reaches the previously selected upper bound on the number of possible breakpoints. For our implementation, we assumed that the maximum number of breakpoints is two. Figure 1 strongly suggests that the price series have no more than two breaks, and in any case, a test for three breaks would have had limited power given the relatively small number of observations in the price series.
The largest chi-squared statistic from all of the sequential steps is the UDMAX test statistic. This statistic is compared to critical values in BP (2003) to evaluate the null of no breaks against the alternative of at least one break. If the UDMAX test fails to reject the null of structural stability, the test procedure is finished and there is no significant evidence of a break in the series. Conversely, if the UDMAX test rejects the null, the next step of the sequential procedure is implemented using the supF T (l+1/l) test.
The supF T (l+1/l) test evaluates the null of l breaks versus the alternative of l+1 breaks and identifies the date of potential breaks. 10 To identify the date of the first breakpoint, we estimate equation 1 at each possible single breakpoint and select the date that minimizes the residual sum of squares. Using this date to split the sample, we then estimate equation 1 over the first subsample with a break at each possible date and do the same for the second subsample.
The date from the two subsamples that minimizes the residual sum of squares identifies the most likely date of a second break. The supF T (2/1) test statistic is then calculated and compared to the appropriate critical value from BP (2003) to determine whether the second breakpoint is significant. What accounts for this variation? The stronger evidence of breaks in MPU prices than in DRAM prices may reflect, at least in part, the greater volatility of DRAM prices. As we showed in figure 1, DRAM prices have not fallen in a smooth fashion but rather have oscillated in periodic cycles around a declining trend. These cycles line up closely with industry accounts of global supply and demand imbalances in the DRAM market. For example, DRAM prices fell rapidly from mid-1995 through mid-1998, which followed a period of large increases in DRAM production capacity. Then, from mid-1998 through late 2000, DRAM prices held nearly steady, supported by a consolidation in the industry and strong demand for computing equipment. These market dynamics may well have made it more difficult for the statistical tests to identify breaks in the underlying downtrend in prices.
Results
As for overall semiconductor prices, this series contains a wide variety of chips other than DRAMs and MPUs that are subject to quite different market and technological forces.
Evidently, the price behavior of these chips differs enough from that of DRAMs and MPUs to partially obscure the structural breaks that are evident in the DRAM and MPU price series.
DECOMPOSITION OF PRICE CHANGE
Given the evidence of breaks in DRAM and MPU price trends, we now develop a decomposition -in the spirit of Flamm (2004) -to explore the sources of these changing trends.
Framework
The number of transistors on a chip is a key determinant of its quality, and we build up our decomposition of constant-quality prices from the following expression for price per transistor:
In words, price per transistor can be decomposed into a price-cost markup and the average cost 
where the dot above a variable signifies the percent change over a given period.
As indicated, our ultimate interest is in decomposing the changes in constant-quality prices rather than the price per transistor. 
Now, combine equations 3 and 4 and rearrange terms to yield
where (1 ) cq R q p
Equation 5 is our decomposition of the percent change in constant-quality price indexes for DRAM and MPU chips. The terms in brackets explain the percent change in price per transistor, based on the contributions from changes in the price-cost markup and cost per transistor. This expression accounts for the cross products between the individual terms, which would be excluded (incorrectly) if we were to simply sum up the percent changes in m and c.
The remaining term, R, represents the difference between the percent change in the constantquality price index and the percent change in the price per transistor. This improvement in chip quality over and above increases in the number of transistors per chip is unobserved and enters our decomposition as a residual. The residual term captures both the amount of unobserved quality improvement and the value that households place on that functionality. The residual also will impound any measurement error in the other terms in the equation.
Empirical Implementation of the Decomposition
We use equation 5 to shed light on why semiconductor prices fell so rapidly from the mid-1990s through 2001 and why these price declines have moderated since 2001. The decomposition begins in the earliest year for which all necessary data are available (1988 for MPUs and 1990 for DRAMs). We then select the break year in the mid-1990s based on the results of the structural break tests reported in section 3. Recall that these tests identified a break in 1994 for MPU prices and one in 1995 for DRAM prices.
The decomposition of MPU prices relies on data for Intel, the dominant producer of MPU chips, while the DRAM decomposition employs data for Micron Technology, the only major DRAM producer in the United States and one of the largest firms in this market worldwide.
Terms in the Decomposition
Price-Cost Markup. The first term on the right side of equation 5 is the rate of change in the price-cost markup, which captures the cyclical swings in market conditions and longer-term changes in market structure. To measure the markup, we start with data from Intel's and
Micron's annual financial statements on the ratio of profits to sales revenue. We then translate this profit margin, denoted by B, into the implied markup of price over average cost, m/ p/c.
Letting Q denote the total number of transistors in the chips sold by either Intel or Micron,
Our figures for B are based on operating income, rather than the bottom-line measure of profits reported on financial statements, net income after tax. We prefer operating income for two reasons. First, reported net income includes the effects of infrequent charges ("special items" in accounting parlance) that can distort the underlying pattern of earnings over time.
Second, net income includes the earnings generated by activities outside the firm's core line of business. For example, Intel maintains an active program of equity investments in other companies, with the aim of nurturing ventures that have the potential to spur demand for its products. The gains from sales of these securities generated more than one-third of Intel's reported net income in 2000. Operating income excludes both special items and the gains (or losses) from financial activities and thus provides a cleaner measure of trends in earnings related to the production of semiconductors.
We make one adjustment to operating income. Focusing on the period between these two episodes, Intel's markup trended up from the late 1980s through the mid-1990s (with some year-to-year variation) and then was relatively stable during the second half of the 1990s.
The dashed line in figure 3 presents the analogous markup for Micron Technology.
Micron's markup exhibits much greater variation than Intel's and is somewhat lower on average. 13 These differences reflect the fact that DRAM production is a highly competitive business subject to periodic imbalances in global supply and demand. Table 3 This drop in price per transistor was quite close to the rate of decline in constant-quality DRAM prices, leaving only a small residual in the decomposition.
Decomposition of DRAM Prices
14 The data appendix provides additional detail on the definition and source for each series used in the decomposition.
The constant-quality DRAM price index and the price per transistor both fell much more rapidly during 1995-2001 than they had in the earlier period. These faster price declines reflect two factors. First, cost per transistor fell at nearly double its rate during 1990-95. In addition, The lower panel highlights the significant role of the "other" term for MPU prices, which includes both the residual term in our decomposition and the cross product term (which is quite small). As discussed above, we believe that the residual term in the MPU decomposition largely reflects improvements in quality over and above those captured by the number of transistors per chip.
Decomposition of MPU Prices

HOW TIGHT IS THE LINK BETWEEN SEMICONDUCTOR PRICES AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS?
As indicated above, some analysts have used constant-quality prices to gauge the pace (and changes in the pace) of technological progress in the semiconductor industry. However, our decomposition of constant-quality prices highlights that swings in margins are quite significant; in addition, these swings can be linked to well-documented shifts in the balance of supply and demand that are largely unrelated to the underlying pace of technical progress. Thus, one would want to strip out margins before drawing any inferences from prices about technology.
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Moreover, our measure of cost per transistor may be affected by factors that are not directly tied to technology. In particular, shifts in scale economies over time and swings in product mix toward and away from more costly chips could affect our measure of cost per transistor.
In a perfect world, we would combine detailed data on prices and quantities of individual chips with a comprehensive economic model of the semiconductor industry to account for these factors. Then, having accounted for these factors, we would apply our structural break machinery to the appropriate measures to search for breaks in the pace of technical progress.
Unfortunately, we do not have sufficiently detailed data to undertake this exercise, and developing a comprehensive model of the industry is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, we turn to other evidence to assess whether there were breaks in the pace of technical progress in the mid-1990s and around 2001. This evidence includes information on technology cycles in the semiconductor industry as well as data from Intel on their cost per transistor for MPUs that control for shifts in product mix and, to a degree, for scale economies.
Technology Cycles
The However, the linkage between technology cycles and price declines in the 1990s has been muddied somewhat by a subsequent revision to the Roadmap. Based on new information from 17 Prior to the 2005 edition, the Roadmap also characterized the minimal feature size associated with each technology cycle. This size measure was known as the "technology node." Because DRAMs historically were the pace-setting chip for scale reduction, technology nodes referred to the minimal width for circuitry in these chips. The 2005 Roadmap, however, stopped using the DRAM-based technology node as a general summary measure of minimal feature size because advances specific to MPU and flash memory chips have been driving the scale reductions for those chips in recent years. The Roadmap now refers to separate scaling benchmarks for DRAM, MPU, and flash memory chips. In addition, the Roadmap's projections for the length of technology cycles now allow for differences across the three chip types.
chip producers, the 2005 edition of the Roadmap re-dated the speedup in technology cycles from the mid-1990s to 1998 for both DRAM and MPU production. Thus, the mid-1990s break in semiconductor prices identified by our structural break tests now precedes the shift to faster product cycles, as measured in the Roadmap, by about three years.
Moreover Although the Roadmap is a rich source of information about semiconductor technology, the process by which the Roadmap committee reaches its judgments about technology cycles is quite opaque. To avoid exclusive reliance on this "black box" approach, we obtained two other indicators of semiconductor technology cycles. The first indicator is the sequence of introduction dates for advances in lithography techniques. Lithography refers to the process by which semiconductor producers imprint a chip's circuitry on the silicon base material.
Accordingly, technological advances in lithography govern the rate of shrinkage in chip components. Our second indicator consists of the introduction dates for the first Intel MPU chip produced with the most advanced lithographic process. We used the information in Table 5 to calculate the length of technology cycles as defined in the Roadmap -i.e., the number of years needed to achieve a 30 percent reduction in 
Technology Cycles (Years needed for 30 percent reduction in scaling)
Lithography process 1969-1993 3.0 1993-2005 1.9 1993-1995 1.3 1995-2001 2.2 2001-2005 2.1 1971-1994 2.9 1994-2005 1.8 1994-1995 .7 1995-2001 2. 2 2001 
Intel MPU chips
Additional Data on Cost per Transistor
The evidence about technology cycles is all well and good, but those data say nothing about the cost of achieving successive advances in technology and so are a step removed from a measure of cost per transistor, a key ingredient in our decomposition of constant-quality prices of semiconductors. However, we obtained cost data from Intel that help bridge the gap. These data show Intel's cost per transistor from 1995 to 2005 for leading-edge, high-volume MPU chips.
20
By focusing on chips at the technological frontier, these data abstract from shifts in product mix.
In addition, the Intel data exclude research and development and other non-production costs, thereby controlling in part for shifts in scale economies. As shown in figure 5 , these data show a fairly steady downtrend of about 35 percent per year in cost per transistor from 1995 to 2005.
Thus, controlling for mix shifts and partly for scale economies appears to eliminate any evidence of a slowdown in the pace of cost reduction in 2001 for MPUs.
CONCLUSIONS
Some analysts (including two of the authors of this paper) have used changes in semiconductor prices to infer the pace of technological progress in this industry. The formal econometric tests in this paper document a statistically significant shift to faster price declines for DRAM and MPU chips in the mid-1990s, followed by a significant reversion to slower price declines in 2001. Taken at face value, this evidence would suggest that the pace of technical progress in semiconductors sped up in the mid-1990s and then slowed around 2001.
However, the analysis in this paper casts doubt on elements of such a conclusion for two reasons. First, our decompositions of DRAM and MPU prices indicate that swings in price-cost markups account for a considerable part of the price dynamics over the past fifteen years. After controlling for these movements in markups, the implied cost trends point to notably smaller swings in the pace of technical progress than do the original price series. Second, the implied cost trends themselves may be affected by factors (such as scale economies or shifts in product mix) that are largely unrelated to the pace of technical progress. To assess this possibility, we went outside the framework of our decomposition to examine other data relevant for gauging the pace of technical advance; these data included indicators of the length of technology cycles and a cleaner cost measure obtained directly from Intel. On balance, this assessment points to a speedup in the pace of technical progress in the mid-1990s, but it indicates no slowdown around
2001.
Where does this leave us? As noted above, the econometric evidence points clearly to breaks in semiconductor price trends in the mid-1990s and in 2001. We believe that the first of
DATA APPENDIX Semiconductor Price Indexes
We relied heavily on internal Federal Reserve price indexes for semiconductor products, which are constructed as part of the Fed's program to publish estimates of industrial production and capacity utilization. For the period since 1992, the Federal Reserve calculates chained, matchedmodel price indexes for different types of semiconductors (e.g. MPUs) from large datasets of prices and shipments of individual chips. We extrapolated the price indexes back from 1992 using price measures from a variety of different sources. Details are provided below.
Aggregate price index, 1975-2004 (annual) For the period 1992-2004, we used the internal Federal Reserve price index for shipments for NAICS product class 3344131 (integrated circuits). We extrapolated this series back to 1977 using an internal Federal Reserve price index for SIC 36741 (integrated circuits). We extrapolated back to 1975 using a price index for memory chips constructed by Grimm (1998 
Series Used in the Decomposition of Price per Transistor
Price-cost markup
As described in the text, we calculated the price-cost markup (m) for Intel and Micron Technology from the equation m = 1/(1 -B), where B represents the ratio of pre-tax operating income (adjusted for the value of stock-option grants) to net sales. The data sources for the components of B are as follows.
Net sales and operating income. These annual series were obtained from Compustat: data item A12 for net sales and data item A178 for pre-tax operating income after depreciation. Because Micron Technology derived a substantial part of its total revenue during 1995-2001 from selling personal computers, we excluded this line of business from the net sales and operating income reported in Compustat for these years. This adjustment was based on data in the company's 10-K filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Value of stock-option grants. For 1994-2004, we estimated the value of option grants using the Black-Scholes formula and data on the companies' option programs reported in their 10-K filings. Prior to 1994, accounting rules did not require firms to report detailed information about their option programs. We extrapolated the estimated 1994 grant values back to earlier years by assuming that the value of grants was a constant share of the value of the firm's common stock.
Operating cost
We calculated operating cost as net sales minus operating income (adjusted for the value of stock-option grants). The series on net sales, operating income, and option grants are the same as those used to calculate the price-cost markup.
Number of transistors shipped
For DRAM chips, we used data from Gartner, Inc. on annual unit shipments of such chips by Micron Technology for each memory class (i.e., 128 megabit chips, 256 megabit chips, and so on). We multiplied the unit shipments in each memory class by the number of transistors per chip and then aggregated the result across the memory classes.
For MPU chips, we matched data on annual unit shipments by chip from Instat MDR with data on the number of transistors per chip. We multiplied the unit shipments by the number of transistors on each chip and then aggregated the result across all chips. For all MPU chips, except Celeron chips produced after 1999, the number of transistors per chip was taken directly from Intel's "Microprocessor Quick Reference Guide" found at http://www.intel.com/pressroom/kits/quickreffam.htm. For the more-recent Celeron chips, we assumed that the number of transistors contained in each chip was the same as that contained in its Pentium counterpart (that is, the Pentium chip produced using the same die and process).
Other Series
Research and development expense
Obtained from Compustat, data item A46.
Depreciation and amortization
Obtained from Compustat, data item A14. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
Declines in Semiconductor and Computer Prices
